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Is institutional ownership related to corporate social responsibility?  
The non-linear relation and its implication for stock return volatility 
Abstract 
This study examines the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and institutional 
investor ownership, and the impact of this relation on stock return volatility. We find that 
institutional ownership does not strictly increase or decrease in CSR; rather, institutional 
ownership is a concave function of CSR. This evidence suggests that institutional investors do 
not see CSR as strictly value enhancing activities. Institutional investors adjust their percentage 
of ownership when CSR activities go beyond the perceived optimal level. Employing the path 
analysis, we also examine the mediating effect of institutional ownership on the relation between 
CSR and stock return volatility. We find that CSR decreases stock return volatility at a 
decreasing rate through its effect on institutional ownership. Our results remain robust under 
several different CSR measures and estimation methods.  
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, institutional ownership, stock return volatility, 




Numerous studies examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and financial performance. Several review papers note that findings from these studies generally 
indicate a positive relation between CSR and corporate economic performance, particularly in 
recent years (Roman et al. 1999; Margolis and Walsh 2001; Orlitzky et al. 2003). However, the 
direction of causality remains mixed (Margolis et al. 2007). Waddock and Graves (1997) find 
that corporate social performance is positively associated with prior financial performance but 
they also find that CSR is positively associated with future financial performance. In contrast, 
Scholtens (2008) finds that the direction of causality is more likely to run from financial 
performance to social performance than the other way around.  Several recent studies further find 
that CSR engagement can lower a firm’s cost of equity (e.g., Chava 2010; 2014; El Ghoul et al. 
2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011) and cost of debt (e.g., Chava 2014; Goss and Roberts 2011). Merton 
(1987) and Heinkel et al. (2001) suggest that when socially conscious investors prefer not to 
include firms with low CSR in their investment portfolio, the expected returns for these excluded 
firms will increase. Because institutional investors are concerned with their portfolio returns and 
their shareholdings play a significant role in the capital market, their preference for or against 
firms that engage in CSR is instrumental to the relation among firms’ CSR, cost of capital, and 
financial performance. 
Institutional investors have publicly stated their preference for firms that appear strong on 
CSR activities. Many institutional investors are signatories to the United Nations’ “Principles for 
Responsible Investment” (UNPRI).1 The most recent UNPRI website reports 1,384 investment 
institutions as signatories, including both public and private pension funds and investment 
1 Available at http://www.unpri.org/signatories/signatories/ 
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managers. As of August 2014, these signatories managed assets in excess of $45 trillion.2  Yet, the 
U.S. Social Investment Forum (SIF) has estimated that merely $6.57 trillion investments are made 
based on social screenings during 2014. There seems to be a discrepancy between what 
institutional investors publicly promote and what they actually value.  
The main objective of this study is to examine the relation between CSR and institutional 
ownership and the impact of this relation on stock return volatility. Understanding institutional 
investors’ preferences toward CSR firms is important because institutional ownership influence 
both equity prices (Gompers and Metrick 2001) and stock return volatility (Bushee and Noe 
2000).3  Previous studies, however, do not find a robust relation between CSR and institutional 
ownership (Gillan et al. 2012). We argue that the model that assumes the linear relation between 
CSR and institutional ownership suffers from model misspecification, which prevents us from 
obtaining any meaningful relation between CSR and institutional ownership largely due to the 
non-linear nature of CSR (e.g., Wang et al. 2008).  
Consistent with the extent literature, we maintain that there are positive financial payoffs 
to CSR that is associated with the acquisition of critical resources controlled by stakeholders. 
These benefits are, however, subject to gradual level off and diminishing returns because CSR 
benefits cannot continue to increase indefinitely. Recent studies (Flammer 2013; 2015) find 
evidence suggesting that CSR has decreasing marginal returns. In addition, both direct costs of 
                                                 
2 Canadian institute of chartered accountants, in their 2010 report of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) 
issues in institutional investor decision making suggest, “… there has been a fundamental shift in consideration of 
ESG matters in investment decision making. In particular, in the past, trustees may have argued that it was beyond 
their fiduciary responsibilities to consider ESG matters in an investment decision. Today, it may be considered a 
breach of fiduciary duty not to consider such matters” (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2010). 
3 Institutional ownership also influences accounting conservatism. Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012), for instance, 
find that higher ownership by institutions that are likely to monitor managers is associated with more conservative 
financial reporting, and ownership by monitoring institutions leads to more conservative reporting. Accounting 
conservatism, however, is not our main focus in this paper. 
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CSR investment and agency costs arising from managerial incentive of building their own 
personal reputation using a firm’s CSR activities make net benefits from CSR non-linear. 
Considering countervailing forces simultaneously, Wang et al. (2008) propose an inverse U-
shaped relationship between corporate philanthropy and financial performance. Considering a 
non-linear relation between CSR and financial performance, a non-linear relation between CSR 
and institutional ownership is quite plausible. 
We first investigate how institutional investors perceive CSR activities by examining the 
relation between standardized CSR scores (CSR index) and institutional ownership. We further 
examine whether institutions with different level of fiduciary duties perceive investment in CSR 
differently. Finally, we examine whether institutional ownership mediate the relation between 
CSR and stock return volatility. Prior studies find an inverse relation between firm risk and CSR 
(e.g., Spicer 1978; McGuire et al. 1988; Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001; Sharfman and Fernando 
2008).  Bushee and Noe (2000) find that institutional investor ownership is negatively associated 
with stock return volatility. To the extent that CSR affects institutional ownership, and stock 
return volatility is inversely related to institutional ownership, we expect that CSR will affect 
stock return volatility through its effect on institutional ownership. 
Employing firms’ CSR activities measured by social ratings from KLD (MSCI ESG) Stats 
database and standardized by year and industry, we find that institutional ownership is a concave 
function of CSR. This evidence is consistent with the premise that institutional investors focus on 
economically optimal value rather than social value of CSR activities. We also find that ownership 
by banks that have more stringent fiduciary restrictions and investment advisors who have the least 
fiduciary restrictions are both a concave function of CSR, consistent with Ali et al. (2004) and 
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Bushee and Goodman (2007) that these institutions across different fiduciary duties behave 
similarly to total population of institutional investors.  
Using the path analysis, we examine the mediating effect of institutional ownership on 
the relation between CSR and stock return volatility. We find the negative effect of institutional 
ownership on stock return volatility, consistent with Bushee and Noe (2000). As the relation 
between CSR and institutional ownership is concave and the relation between institutional 
ownership and stock return volatility is negative, we expect the indirect effect of CSR on stock 
return volatility to be convex. We find the result is consistent with our prediction. The indirect 
effect of CSR on stock return volatility through its effect on ownership by banks, investment 
advisors, and pension funds is also convex.  
Our results are robust when we examine the effect of two-year lagged measure of CSR, as 
opposed to one-year lagged measure of CSR, on institutional ownership and stock return volatility. 
In addition, we find that our results are not driven by the reverse causality. Our results are also 
consistent in both the level and the change specifications and robust to various subsample periods. 
We also conduct several robustness tests by including KLD corporate governance criterion into our 
CSR measure, by separating CSR strengths and concerns, and by using CSR raw scores instead of 
CSR index.  Overall, we find that our results are robust across different specifications.     
Our study contributes to existing literature by revealing that the motivation of 
institutional ownership to invest in stocks of CSR firms is unlikely for social values. Consistent 
with the premise that institutions focus on the valuation effect of CSR activities and the marginal 
benefit of CSR diminishes as CSR investment increases (Wang et al. 2008; Kim and Statman 
2012), we find that institutional ownership is a concave function of CSR. Our study shows that 
the weak linear relation between CSR and institutional ownership documented in prior studies is 
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due to the non-linear relation between the two. Furthermore, we find that institutional ownership 
has an important mediating effect for the relation between CSR and firm risk measured by the 
stock return volatility. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the 
mediating effect of institutional ownership on the association between CSR and stock return 
volatility. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review 
the related literature and discuss research issues. Then, we discuss the sample and measures of 
CSR and institutional ownership as well as our research design followed by the empirical results 
section. The final section summarizes our conclusions. 
 
Literature Review and Research Issues 
Relation between CSR activities and institutional investor ownership 
Similar to Mackey et al. (2007), Graff-Zivin and Small (2005), Baron et al. (2011), and Dan 
and Scholtens (2015), we allow for heterogeneity among investors with respect to their attitude 
toward CSR. In particular, Graff-Zivin and Small (2005) and Baron et al. (2011) develop the 
Modigliani-Miller (1958) social market theory to show how CSR is priced in the capital markets 
under heterogeneous investors. If investors consider firms’ socially responsible activities as a perfect 
substitute for their personal giving, then the capital markets are indifferent between firms with and 
without CSR. Under heterogeneous investors, however, the markets assign non-zero value for CSR 
(either positive or negative), leading to the significant effect of CSR on investors’ investment 
decision. As an important part of heterogeneous investors, institutional investors may prefer CSR 
firms because their constituents want socially responsible investing and are willing to pay a premium 
for investing in CSR firms to fulfill social objectives beyond their economic objective.  
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Empirical studies that examine institutional ownership in CSR firms provide evidence that 
are fragmented and inconsistent. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that “sin” stocks, i.e., firms 
operating in the alcohol, tobacco, and gambling industries, are less held by norm-constrained 
institutions such as pension plans as compared to mutual or hedge funds. Fernando et al. (2010) 
find that both green firms and toxic firms have lower institutional holdings compared to neutral 
firms.  Harjoto and Jo (2011) find that institutional ownership increases firms’ CSR engagement 
and firms with higher CSR activities and higher institutional ownership tend to have higher 
financial performance.  Chava (2014) finds the negative relation between institutional ownership 
and a firm's environmental concerns. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that dedicated institutions hold 
shares of firms that initiate CSR disclosure and exhibit better CSR performance. In contrast, a 
concurrent study by Gillan et al. (2012) finds that institutions hold fewer shares of firms that 
improve their social and environmental scores.  
In general, however, the scope of prior studies is limited by their specific research 
questions. Hong and Kacperczyk’s (2009) analysis is limited to sin stocks that are generally 
defined by industries in which firms are operating. Fernando et al. (2010) and Chava (2014) limit 
their investigation to environmental dimension of CSR, and Dhaliwal et al’s (2011) findings are 
conditional on initiation of voluntary CSR disclosure. Gillan et al. (2012) focus on a more 
general setting but their results are difficult to interpret and it may suffer from a potential model-
misspecification problem since it assumes a linear relation between CSR and institutional 
ownership.  
Since it is institutional investors’ fiduciary duty to make investment decisions to generate 
financial returns for their clients and invest based on their clients’ investment preference (Del 
Guercio 1996), the nature of the relation between CSR and financial performance will play a 
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crucial role in determining institutional investors’ preferences for investing in socially 
responsible firms’ stocks (Cox et al. 2008). At the same time, institutional investors have come 
under increasing pressures to encompass CSR initiatives in their investment criteria (Cox et al. 
2004). Both of these factors will influence the relation between CSR and institutional ownership. 
The extant literature has generally claimed that CSR activities can contribute to higher 
financial performance by either increasing revenues through enhancing the level of demand for a 
firm’s products or by reducing its price sensitivity (Navarro 1988; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; 
Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). Additionally, CSR activities can lower production costs either by 
reducing wages, improving labor productivity, increasing the supply of qualified labor force 
(Moskowitz 1972; Turban and Greening 1996), or by reducing the level of waste produced in 
production processes (Porter and van der Linde 1995; Konar and Cohen 2001). However, 
benefits from CSR cannot increase indefinitely and will gradually level off.  
Wang et al. (2008) suggest that total benefit of corporate philanthropy will rise more 
slowly with each increase in philanthropic contributions. Recent studies provide empirical 
evidence of decreasing marginal returns from CSR activities. Flammer (2015) examines the 
effect of CSR on financial performance based on the regression discontinuity design. 
Specifically, she analyze the effect of CSR-related shareholder proposals that pass or fail by a 
small margin of votes. She finds that adopting a CSR-related proposal leads to superior financial 
performance. However, the effect is weaker for companies with higher levels of CSR, suggesting 
that CSR is a resource with decreasing marginal returns. Flammer (2013) also finds evidence 
suggesting that environmental CSR has decreasing marginal returns. She finds that the positive 
(negative) stock market reaction to eco-friendly (eco-harmful) events is smaller for companies 
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with higher levels of environmental CSR. These studies strongly suggest a non-linear relation 
between CSR activities and benefits from such activities.  
CSR, by definition, imposes a direct cost on the firm (Barnett and Salomon 2006; 
Ullmann 1985). These costs often include the diversion of valuable corporate resources such as 
cash, products, facilities, and human resources devoted to corporate charitable programs 
(Brammer and Millington 2003; McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Saiia et al. 2003). Each dollar 
spent to enhance managers’ personal goals reduces each dollar return to the institutional 
investors. Thus, we consider the cost of CSR as a linear upward sloping function. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
When we consider both the benefit and the cost of CSR simultaneously, an inverse U shape 
(concave) of net benefit emerges as shown in Figure 1. In addition to direct costs associated with 
CSR investment, the agency theory suggests that managerial discretion in corporate philanthropy 
may enable managers to use CSR to enhance their own private personal reputations within social 
circles or to further political or career agendas at the expense of the firm’s owners. Wang et al. 
(2008) consider both direct cost of corporate philanthropy and agency cost of managerial 
misconduct. Considering countervailing forces simultaneously, Wang et al. (2008) also propose an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between corporate philanthropy and financial performance. 
Despite institutional investors’ willingness to support CSR causes, there are limits to the 
amount and type of resources that these socially conscious institutional investors are able to 
control and thus potentially provide to the firm. Although socially conscious institutional 
investors are willing to sacrifice part of their financial wealth to support CSR initiating firms, 
they nevertheless expect reasonable returns from their financial investments. Within certain 
limits, CSR helps the firm secure critical resources controlled by various stakeholders and 
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provide insurance-like protections (Godfrey 2005) that reduce the firm’s exposure to the risk of 
losing critical resources and therefore increases its value. As a result, institutional investors will 
increase its shareholdings. However, as CSR increases beyond a sufficiently high level, this 
positive benefit from CSR will level off. The cost of CSR is increasing in the level of CSR due to 
direct costs of CSR activities and agency costs. Institutional investors will withdraw their 
shareholdings as the firm’s costs continue to increase. Thus we expect the relationship between 
CSR and institutional ownership to be concave. 
    
Types of institutional investors and the relation between CSR and institutional ownership 
Institutions of different types could have heterogeneous preferences toward firms CSR 
activities depending on their fiduciary responsibilities. Institutions are bounded by their fiduciary 
responsibility to invest funds prudently on behalf of their clients (Del Guercio 1996). Bushee 
(2001) finds that the level of ownership by institutions with more stringent fiduciary 
responsibilities is positively associated with the present value of short-term expected earnings 
and negatively related to the present value of long-term earnings. Differences in the fiduciary 
responsibilities can influence institutional investors’ perception about the value of CSR activities.  
Institutions with more stringent fiduciary responsibilities are more sensitive to short-term 
changes in earnings (Bushee 2001). On the other hand, institutions with more stringent fiduciary 
obligations face strict and prudent investment standards and invest in a more risk-averse manner 
(Del Guercio 1996). These institutions tilt their portfolios toward characteristics that would 
justify the prudence of the investment (Bushee and Goodman 2007). Investments in CSR firms 
may look more risk-averse and prudent. Therefore, it is an empirical question as to how 
institutions with more stringent fiduciary responsibilities perceive CSR activities. 
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Relation between CSR and stock return volatility 
Several studies report an inverse relation between some measures of firm risk and CSR 
(e.g., Spicer 1978; McGuire et al. 1988; Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001; Sharfman and Fernando 
2008).  These studies, however, are silent on the mechanics through which CSR affects firm risk. 
While dedicated institutions might be interested in firms with stable returns, transient 
institutions’ aggressive trading behavior and propensity to engage in large-scale selling when 
faced with bad news can lead to higher stock return volatility (Porter 1992). Prior research 
suggests that changes of institutional ownership are associated with future stock return volatility 
(Sias 1996; Potter 1992). Moreover, Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) find that both individual 
trades and packages of trades by institutional investors have sizable price impacts over short 
horizons, with high turnover institutions producing the largest price impacts. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) find a negative correlation between institutional ownership and 
stock return volatility. While some institutional investors such as hedge funds and pension funds 
are well positioned to take on risk associated with high stock return volatility, they must pay 
large expected return premium to get investors to hold risky assets (Cochrane 2001). 
Furthermore, different trading behavior across institutions may increase or decrease stock return 
volatility of firms in their investment portfolio. To the extent that institutional ownership is 
associated with CSR and stock return volatility is affected by institutional ownership, we expect 
CSR to be related to stock return volatility indirectly through its effect on institutional ownership. 
If the relation between institutional ownership and stock return volatility is negative and the 
relation between institutional ownership and CSR is concave, then we expect that the effect of 
CSR activity on stock return volatility through its impact on institutional ownership will be 
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convex. Figure 2 indicates that the indirect relation between stock return volatility and CSR is 
convex as a result of the concave relation between CSR and institutional ownership (shown in 
Figure 1). We also expect the indirect effect of CSR on volatility of stock returns through 
institutional ownership varies across different types of institutions as the relation between CSR 
and institutional ownership and the relation between institutional ownership and stock return 
volatility are likely to vary across different types of institutions.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Sample and Research Design 
Sample descriptions  
We begin with a sample of firms in the Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini’s (KLD’s) Stats (or 
MSCI ESG Stats) database from 1991 to 2012. We merge the KLD Stats data with the institutional 
ownership data from Thomson Reuter’s 13F database. Institutional ownership information is drawn 
from the fourth quarter filings of each calendar year. We utilize the 1991-1993 KLD data to measure 
the lag effect of firm CSR performance on institutional ownership in 1994.4  We obtain firms’ 
financial information from the Compustat database, and stock prices and returns from Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. After eliminating observations where control variables 
have missing values, the final sample consists of 13,033 firms-year observations over 1994-2012. 
 
Measures of CSR and institutional ownership 
                                                 
4 We examine the effect of one-year and two-year lagged CSR on the current year institutional ownership. In 
addition, to mitigate the problem of low statistical power arising from the stickiness of social scores in KLD data, 
we measure changes in CSR as changes from year t-3 to year t-1. 
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We first calculate the CSR net counts as the number of strengths minus concerns across 
five non-exclusionary dimensions of CSR: community, diversity, employee, environment, and 
product. We do not consider exclusionary categories (alcohol, gambling, military contracting, 
nuclear power, and tobacco) in constructing CSR scores as these dimensions do not pertain to firms’ 
discretionary activities. We exclude human rights criteria since human rights criteria were added 
to the KLD Stats in 2002. Following Jo and Harjoto (2011) and Kim et al. (2012), we also 
exclude corporate governance as it is often considered as a distinct construct from CSR.5 We 
transform CSR net counts to create the CSR index that ranges from 0 to 1 to facilitate 
comparison of CSR scores across years.6 We use a transformation that preserves the relative 
distances between the values of CSR net count for firms within the same Fama-French (1997) 48 
industries in year t. We normalize CSR net scores by industry and year because important CSR 
issues, and thus CSR practices, in each industry are different and KLD changes CSR items over 
the years. Without normalizing CSR net scores, it is difficult to compare CSR scores across 
industries and years. Our approach is similar to those in Baron et al. (2011) and Jo and Harjoto 
(2012). Specifically, we construct our CSR index (CSRIDX) based on the following formula: 
 
CSRIDX for firm i in year t =  
(CSR net count for firm i in year t – Min. CSR net count for firm i’ industry in year t) 
(Max. CSR net count for firm i’ industry in year t – Min. CSR net count for firm i’ industry in year t) 
 
 
                                                 
5 We conduct a robustness test based on CSR index incorporating governance net counts. Our untabulated results are 
largely consistent with those based on CSR index excluding governance scores. 
6 We conduct a robustness test based on the CSR raw scores counts rather than CSR index and our untabulated 
results are largely consistent with those in Tables 4-6. 
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As we drive our CSR index by normalizing CSR scores with respect to the industry and 
year, CSR index can be viewed as a firm’s CSR performance relative to its peers in the same 
industry and in the same fiscal year. 
We calculate the percentage of all institutional holdings (PCTINSTI) of the firm as the 
ratio of the sum of shares held by all institutions for each firm to the total shares outstanding. We 
also classify institutions based on their fiduciary responsibilities (Bushee 2001): banks (BNK), 
insurance companies (INS), investment banks and independent investment advisers (INVIIA), 
and pension funds, foundations, endowments, and miscellaneous institutions (MISC). Banks 
manage equities on behalf of individuals and other institutions through their trust departments. 
They face strict fiduciary requirements that motivate them to avoid stocks that courts would view 
as imprudent (Badrinath et al. 1989; Del Guercio 1996). Miscellaneous group includes private 
pensions, public pensions, and endowments of universities and foundations. This group of 
institutions also faces fairly strict fiduciary responsibilities, though not so strict as bank trusts 
(O'Barr and Conley 1992; Del Guercio 1996). Insurance companies hold equities as an 
investment vehicle for their premiums and manage some private pension funds. In contrast to 
banks and pensions, these institutions are subject to less restrictive fiduciary constraints. 
Investment companies and advisers manage individual investments through mutual funds and 
serve as external fund managers for pensions and endowments. Historically, investment banks 
and investment advisers have been held to the least restrictive fiduciary responsibilities of any 
type of institution (Del Guercio 1996).  
 
Research design 
Association between CSR and institutional ownership 
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To examine how institutional investors respond to changes in CSR performance, we first 
consider regressing institutional ownership (PCTINSTI) on the lagged CSR index (CSRIDX) 
constructed from KLD data along with control variables based on the existing literature. 
 






α CONTROL VARIABLES + ε          (1) 
We replace PCTINSTI with ownership by various types of institutions to examine whether 
different types of institutions perceive CSR activities differently. Appendix A summarizes 
various institutional ownership and CSR measures.  
Our choice of control variables generally follows Del Guercio (1996), Bushee and Noe 
(2000), Bushee (2001), and Gompers and Metrick (2001). Prior research shows that institutional 
ownership is associated with factors such as performance, liquidity, risk, and size. Market-
adjusted return (MRET) over the past year is included as a control for recent stock performance 
which is found positively associated with institutional holdings in the prior studies (e.g., 
Gompers and Metrick 2001). Average monthly trading volume over total shares outstanding 
(TVOL) is included to control for institutional investors’ preference for liquidity. Controlling for 
performance also helps us to exclude performance as an omitted correlated variable that explains 
the relation between institutional ownership and CSR. 
Proxies for firm idiosyncratic risk include the market model beta (BETA) as a proxy for 
systematic risk, the natural logarithm of standard deviation from market model residuals 
calculated from daily stock returns in a year (IRISK) as a proxy for unsystematic risk, and total 
debt to total asset ratio (DEBTR) as a measure of bankruptcy risk. Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of market value of equity (MKTVAL) and included to control for institutional 
investors preference for larger firms.  
ꐠր
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We also include a number of variables to capture changes in fundamental growth and 
income ratios upon which institutions might base their trading decisions (Bushee and Noe 2001; 
Gompers and Metrick 2001). These variables include the ratio of earnings (income before 
extraordinary item) to market value of equity (EP), the book to market value of common equity 
ratio (BP), the dividend yield (DP), and sales growth (SALEGRW). An indicator variable for 
inclusion in the S&P 500 index (SP500) and the natural log of common shares outstanding 
(SHROUT) are also added to control for institutional investors’ preference toward major stock 
indices and firms with a large number of shares outstanding. We control for the S&P stock rating 
(SPRATING) as a measure of prudence of the investment because some institutions avoid stocks 
with lower ratings due to fiduciary concerns (Badrinath et al. 1989; Del Guercio 1996). Firm age 
(FIRMAGE), measured as the number of years since the firm first appears in the CRSP database, 
is included to control for the prudence of an investment (Del Guercio 1996). 
We further control for the previously documented positive relation between earnings 
performance and institutional ownership (e.g., Del Guercio 1996) by including recent changes in 
annual earnings per share divided by prior stock price (CEPS). We include the ratio of research 
and development expense to sales (RNDR) to control for institutions’ myopia (Bushee 1998). 
Appendix B summarizes definitions of control variables.   
Estimating equation (1) implies that we assume the linear relation between CSR and 
institutional ownership. As we discussed earlier, however, this relation may not be linear 
depending on the institutions’ view on firm CSR activities. Wang et al. (2008) find a quadratic 
relation between corporate social performance (CSP) and financial performance. Fisman et al. 
(2008) also argue that there is a non-linear relation between CSR and financial performance 
ց
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through advertising and product differentiation. Thus, we add a quadratic term to equation (1) to 
examine a potentially non-linear relation between CSR and institutional ownership.  
  






α CONTROL VARIABLES + ε   (2) 
where CSRIDX_C(t-1) and CSRIDX_C2(t-1) are the centered CSR index and the centered CSR 
index squared in year t-1, where year t is the year that institutional ownership is measured. 
Since there is a high correlation between the CSR index and the CSR index squared, we 
transform our CSR index by subtracting its mean value from each value to mitigate the structural 
multicollinearity problem in our regression. This method is known as centering the predictor 
(Rupert 2004). By centering the CSR index, we can also evaluate whether the institutional 
ownership is increasing or decreasing at the mean value of the CSR index.  
 
Association between CSR and stock return volatility 
 Prior studies examine the relation between CSR and firm risk, but are generally mute 
about the mechanism through which CSR affects firm risk. Because we examine the relation 
between CSR and institutional ownership, it is of our interest to investigate whether CSR affects 
firm risk through its effect on institutional ownership. That is, we examine whether institutional 
ownership mediates the relation between CSR and firm risk.  
To examine one consequence of CSR activities attracting institutional investors, we use stock 
return volatility as a measure of firm risk because Bushee and Noe (2000) show the relation 
between institutional ownership and stock return volatility. To assess both the direct effect of CSR 
on stock return volatility and its indirect effect through its effect on institutional ownership, we use the 
path analysis that can examine the mediating effect of institutional ownership on the relation 
between CSR and stock return volatility. Path analysis allows us to examine direct and indirect 
ւ凰
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effects of CSR on stock return volatility. As prior studies document that stock return volatility 
decreases in institutional ownership, CSR may affect stock return volatility through its effect on 
institutional ownership. Alternatively, CSR may have a direct effect on stock return volatility 
without going through institutional ownership. OLS cannot test the mediating (indirect) effect of 
CSR on stock return volatility via institutional ownership.7 Path analysis, originated from the series 
of works by Sewall Wright (e.g., Wright 1921, 1923) and applied to a vast array of complex modeling 
in accounting, econometrics, management, marketing, and sociology literature (Stage et al. 2004), 
quantifies the direct and indirect effects from the independent variable to the dependent variable. We 
jointly estimate equation (2) and the following equation to obtain path coefficients.8 We then calculate 
direct and indirect effects based on path coefficients. 
 







α CONTROL VARIABLES + ε            (3) 
 The dependent variable (DEVRET(t+1)) is the natural logarithm of the one-year ahead 
standard deviation of daily stock returns over a year’s time. Following Bushee and Noe (2000), we 
include in equation (3) market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (MRET), the average monthly trading 
volume (TVOL), the market value of equity (MKTVAL), the debt-to-asset ratio (DEBTR), the EP ratio 
                                                 
7  CSR may affect institutional stock return volatility directly and/or indirectly via its effect on institutional 
ownership. Path analysis allows us to examine direct and indirect effect separately. While Granger-causation test 
helps researchers identify a causal relationship, it does not allow researchers to distinguish direct and indirect 
effects. We provide Granger-causation analysis in Table 8. 
8 Path coefficients are standardized regression coefficients. Because we need to compare effects across equations 
and between regressors, we need to standardize the effects. While path analysis is useful because it allows 
researchers to examine direct and indirect effects simultaneously with multiple independent and dependent variables, 
it cannot establish absolute direction of causality. Path analysis cannot distinguish which of two distinct path 
diagrams is more correct, nor can it distinguish whether the correlation between A and B represents a causal effect 
of A on B, a causal effect of B on A, mutual dependence on other variables C, D, and so forth (Lea 1997). Despite 
those limitations, the use of path analysis in social science research has allowed researchers to gain additional 
understanding and insights into various important issues, and therefore theoretical knowledge on the part of the 
researcher is critical to the successful application of path analysis (Stage et al. 2004). 
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(EP), the BP ratio (BP), the dividend-to-equity ratio (DP), sales growth (SALEGRW), an indicator 
variable for inclusion in the S&P 500 index (SP500), S&P ratings (SPRATING), and the natural log 
of common shares outstanding (SHROUT) as control variables. Following Bushee and Noe (2000), we 
measure DEVRET for year t+1 and measure institutional ownership and control variables for year t. To 
examine the effect of CSR on institutional ownership and DEVRET, CSR is measured for year t-1 (i.e., 
one-year lag).  
The path coefficient (i.e., coefficient standardized by the ratio of the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable and the standard deviation of the regressor) on CSRIDX_C(t-1) and 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1) in equation (3) is the direct effect of CSR and CSR squared on stock return 
volatility. The indirect effect of the CSR and CSR squared on stock return volatility is calculated 
by the product of the path coefficient on CSRIDX_C(t-1) and CSRIDX_C2(t-1) in equation (2) 
and the path coefficient on PCTINSTI in equation (3).  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
The direct and indirect effects are also depicted by the path diagram in Figure 3. In Figure 3, a 
is a path coefficient on the centered CSR index (CSRIDX_C(t-1)) in equation (3), b is the path 
coefficient on the centered CSR index squared (CSRIDX_C2(t-1)) in equation (3), c is the path 
coefficient on CSRIDX_C(t-1) in equation (2), d is the path coefficient on CSRIDX_C2(t-1) in equation 
(2), and e is the path coefficient on institutional ownership (PCTINSTI) in equation (3). a is the direct 
effect of the centered CSR index on stock return volatility, b is the direct effect of the centered CSR 
index squared on stock return volatility, the product of c and e is the indirect effect of the centered CSR 
index on stock return volatility through institutional ownership, and the product of d and e is the 





Table 1 presents the sample distribution across 48 industries based on Fama and French 
(1997) industry classifications. Financial institutions and utilities represent substantial portions 
of the sample.9 The average percentage of institutional shareholdings (PCTINSTI) for firms in 
the sample is between 53% and 85% for all industries. This indicates that the institutional holders 
represent the majority of firms’ shareholders. Therefore, this study examines the relation (if any) 
between CSR and the shareholders who hold the large block or majority of firms’ stock. The 
average CSR index of the firms is between 0.28 and 0.66 indicating that there are wide variations 
of CSR activities across different industries even after standardizing the CSR index for each 
industry and each year. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics.  We winsorize all continuous variables 
at 1% and 99% of the distribution.10 Average CSRIDX(t-1) is less than 0.5 indicating a relatively 
small number of observations with high CSR scores. The average institutional ownership 
(PCTINSTI) is 70%. Independent investment advisers (INVIIA) have the higher percentage 
ownership relative to insurance companies (INS). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Descriptive statistics for control variables are also reported in Table 2. The average beta 
(BETA) is 1.14 which indicates that firms in the sample are slightly riskier than the market 
portfolio. Sample firms have average total debt ratio (DEBTR) of 20.5% and book to market 
value (BP) of 0.51. The average dividend payout ratio (DP) is 1.71% and firms’ average sales 
                                                 
9 We conduct a robustness test by excluding financial and utility firms and find qualitatively similar results.  
10 The results without winsorization are qualitatively similar. 
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growth is 8.68%. Approximately 49% of the firms are listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500 
(S&P500) Index and average firm age (FIRMAGE) is about 28 years. The minimum firm age is 
3.47 years and the maximum is 83.86 years indicating that the sample includes both young and 
mature firms. 
We report mean institutional ownership across quintiles of CSRIDX(t-1) in Panel B of 
Table 2. As shown, mean institutional ownership (PCTINSTI) increases from the lowest quintile 
to the 2nd quintile, but decreases afterwards. Ownership by investment banks and independent 
investment advisers (INVIIA) shows the same pattern. Ownership by banks (BNK) increases from 
the lowest quintile to the 4th quintile, but decreases afterwards. Ownership by miscellaneous 
institutions (MISC) shows a similar pattern. Ownership by insurance companies (INS), however, 
decreases first and then increases as CSRIDX(t-1) increases. We also find that the average firms’ 
value, measured by the mean of firms’ Tobin Q (TOBINQ) increases from the lowest CSR 
quintile to the 3rd quintile but then decreases after the 3rd quintile indicating a concave relation 
between firm value and CSR.  We find that the one-year ahead natural logarithmic of average 
standard deviation of daily stock returns (DEVRET) decreases initially up to the 3rd quintile and 
then increases afterward indicating a convex relation between stock return volatility and CSR. 
The results in Panel B of Table 2 justify the examination of the non-linear relation between 
institutional ownership and firms’ CSR in our regression model. Given the different patterns of 
the relation between CSRIDX and ownership by different types of institutional investors, it is 
also important to examine various types of institutions separately.       




Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations among control variables. Most of the 




Relation between institutional investor ownership and CSR  
We first examine the impact of CSR on institutional ownership assuming the linear 
relation between the two. Then, we regress institutional ownership on the centered CSR index 
and the centered CSR index squared considering a possible non-linear relation between 
institutional investor ownership and CSR performance. All regression analyses include Fama and 
French (1997) 48 industry dummies and year dummies. The t-statistics are estimated based on 
standard errors clustered by the firm level.  
Table 4 presents the results. The results in the first column show that when the relation is 
restricted to be linear, the overall impact of CSR on institutional ownership is statistically 
insignificant. This insignificant finding is consistent with existing studies (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; 
Gillan et al. 2012). More importantly, this finding implies that the relation between CSR and 
institutional ownership might be neither strictly positive nor strictly negative.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Thus, we examine the quadratic relation between ownership by institutions and the 
centered CSR index and CSR index squared. The second column of Table 4 shows the negative 
but statistically insignificant coefficient on the centered CSR index and the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on the centered CSR index squared (CSRIDX_C2(t-1)). This 
result suggests that there is a concave relation between institutional ownership and CSR, which 
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is consistent with our prediction. The insignificant coefficient on the centered CSR index 
(CSRIDX_C(t-1)) implies that the maximum level of institutional ownership is approximately at 
the mean level of CSR performance and as the firms’ increase CSR beyond its current mean, 
institutional ownership starts to decline. Overall, our empirical results demonstrate that 
institutional investors adjust their shareholdings according to their value-maximizing view and 
consider that beyond the optimal level, additional CSR investment is value reducing activities. 
Next, we examine the impact of CSR across different types of institutional investors 
based on their fiduciary responsibilities and report the results in Table 5.  We find that the 
relations between CSR and institutional ownership across different types are generally 
insignificant.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The quadratic relation between CSR and institutional ownership across different level of 
fiduciary responsibilities shows that there is a concave relation between CSR activities and 
ownership by banks (BNK) which is considered to have the most restrictive fiduciary 
responsibilities and the investment banks and independent investment advisers (INVIIA) which is 
considered to have the least restrictive fiduciary duties. The relations between CSR and 
ownership by insurance companies and miscellaneous institutions are also concave. 11  This 
evidence indicates that the relation between CSR and institutional ownership does not vary 
across different levels of fiduciary obligations.   
The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with Bushee (2001). We 
find that market adjusted returns (MRET) positively affect ownership by insurance companies 
                                                 
11 The level of institutional ownership may be correlated with the lagged level of institutional ownership. We 
include the lagged level of institutional ownership at the beginning of the year as an additional control variable in 
the regressions and rerun our analyses. Our untabulated results are largely consistent with those in Tables 4-6. 
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(INS) and independent investment advisers (INVIIA) but adversely affect ownership by pension 
funds and foundations (MISC), which are consistent with Bushee (2001). The market value of 
equity (MKTVAL) positively affects almost all types of institutional investors.   
Firm’s performance is always a potential omitted variable in any CSR study. In our case, 
better performing firms can afford CSR and institutions may hold larger ownership of these 
firms. To address the endogeneity problem, we have included various performance-related 
controls, including market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (MRET), natural logarithm of market 
value of common equity (MKTVAL), the ratio of income before extraordinary item to market 
value of common equity (EP), changes in annual earnings per share deflated by prior stock price 
(CEPS), and sales growth (SALEGRW), in our regressions.  
 
Association between CSR and stock return volatility 
In the previous section, we show that there is a quadratic relation between CSR and 
institutional ownership, indicating that institutional investors focus on value maximization. 
Given that firms stock return volatility is inversely related to institutional ownership (Bushee and 
Noe 2000; Gompers and Metrick 2001), we expect that there is also a non-linear relation 
between CSR and stock return volatility. We examine the non-linear effect of CSR on stock 
return volatility directly and indirectly through its effect on institutional ownership.  
To assess and compare direct and indirect effect of CSR on stock return volatility, we 
conduct the path analysis similar to Bushee and Noe (2000). We jointly estimate two regressions, 
equations (2) and (3). In the first equation, we regress institutional ownership on the centered 
CSR index, the centered CSR index squared, and control variables. In the second equation, we 
regress stock return volatility on institutional ownership, the centered CSR index and the 
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centered CSR index squared, and control variables. Path coefficients are calculated by 
standardizing regression coefficients in two equations and the direct and indirect effects are 
determined based on path coefficients. If the relation between CSR and institutional ownership is 
concave and institutional ownership and stock return volatility are negatively associated, the 
indirect effect of CSR on stock return volatility will be convex. In other words, increases in CSR 
indirectly reduce firm risk through institutional ownership up to a point at which institutional 
investors view CSR activities as optimal. We present the results from estimating equation (3) in 
Panel A of Table 6 and summarize the direct and indirect effect of CSR on stock return volatility 
in Panel B of Table 6.12 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
As shown in the first column in Panel A of Table 6, on average institutional ownership 
(PCTINSTI) is inversely related to stock return volatility. The results for ownership by various 
types of institutions based on their investment horizons and fiduciary responsibilities are shown 
in the second column. We find that ownership by banks (BNK), independent investment advisers 
(INVIIA), and pension funds, foundations, and miscellaneous institutions (MISC) are negatively 
associated with stock return volatility. Banks have the highest fiduciary restrictions and 
independent investment advisers have the least restrictive fiduciary duties. Thus the results 
suggest that the extent of fiduciary obligations does not affect the relation between institutional 
ownership and stock return volatility. The coefficient on CSRIDX_C(t-1) and the coefficient on 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1) are insignificant, suggesting that after controlling for institutional ownership, 
there is no direct impact of one-year lag CSR activities on firm risk. 
                                                 
12 Statistical significance for the indirect effect in Panel B is determined based on statistical significance of the path 
coefficient on centered CSR index (CSRIDX_C(t-1)) and centered CSR index squared (CSRIDX_C2(t-1)) in the first 
regression and statistical significance of the path coefficient on institutional ownership in the second regression. We 
take the lesser of the two statistical significance levels. 
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As shown in Panel B of Table 6, we find a significant indirect effect of CSR on stock 
return volatility through its effect on institutional ownership. Focusing on the overall institutional 
ownership (PCTINSTI), we find that the indirect effect of the centered CSR index squared 
(CSRIDX_C2(t-1)) on stock return volatility is positive and statistically significant, while the 
indirect effect of the centered CSR index (CSRIDX_C(t-1)) is insignificant. The significantly 
positive indirect effect of CSRIDX_C2(t-1) suggests that the indirect relation between CSR on 
stock return volatility is convex, consistent with our prediction that CSR reduces firm risk 
indirectly through institutional ownership up to a point where institutional investors view CSR as 
still value maximizing activities. 
When we examine the indirect effect of CSR on stock return volatility through ownership 
by institutions with different level of fiduciary responsibilities, we find that the indirect effects 
through ownership by banks (BNK),  investment bank and independent investment advisers 
(INVIIA), and pension funds, foundations, and miscellaneous institutions (MISC) are similar to 
that through the overall institutional ownership. Overall, we find evidence that CSR activities 
affect stock return volatility through its effect on institutional ownership.   
 
Two-year lag and causality of the relation 
Thus far, we examine the relation between institutional ownership and one-year lagged 
CSR in order to examine the effect of CSR activities on institutional ownership. Considering the 
delayed effect of CSR on institutional ownership and stock return volatility, we also use two-
year lagged CSR variables. We report the result in Table 7. We summarize the effect of CSR on 
the aggregated institutional ownership in Panel A, the effect of CSR across different types of 
institutional investors in Panel B, the result from regressing stock return volatility on institutional 
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ownership and CSR in Panel C, and the direct and indirect effect of CSR on stock return 
volatility in Panel D. The results are qualitatively the same as those in Tables 4-6 except that we 
find strong positive direct effect of two-year lag CSR on stock return volatility.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
    
Reverse causality is a potential concern. While firms with high CSR ratings might attract 
institutional investors, institutional investors might well encourage managers to increase CSR for 
legitimacy concerns. Dam and Scholtens (2012, 2013), for example, suggest that with large 
shareholders, CSR need to be included in their performance assessment. To examine this potential 
reverse causality, we regress CSR on one-year or two-year lagged institutional ownership and 
report the results in Panel A of Table 8. We find that lagged institutional ownership does not affect 
CSR ratings. We also regress one-year ahead institutional ownership on lagged stock return 
volatility after controlling for lagged CSR ratings in order to examine the potential reverse 
causality between institutional ownership and stock return volatility. The results are reported in 
Panel B of Table 8. Again, we find no evidence that lagged stock return volatility affects 
institutional ownership. Therefore, it is unlikely that our results in Tables 4-7 are driven by the 
reverse causality. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Change on change analysis 
Finally, we examine whether changes in CSR ratings lead to changes in institutional 
ownership and changes in stock return volatility. Because CSR ratings in KLD Stats tend to be 
sticky, using a change specification may reduce the statistical power. To mitigate this problem, 
similar to Dam and Scholtens (2012), Harjoto and Jo (2011), and Jo and Harjoto (2011, 2012), 
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we use changes in changes analysis, but we take changes in changes over two years, i.e., from 
year t-3 to year t-1. Table 9 reports the results from the change specifications. We summarize the 
effect of changes in CSR on changes in institutional ownership in Panel A, the effect of changes 
in institutional ownership and changes in CSR on changes in stock return volatility in Panel B, 
and the direct and indirect effect of changes in CSR on changes in stock return volatility in Panel 
C. The tenor of the results is the same as that from the level specification reported in Tables 4-6. 
That is, the relation between changes in institutional ownership and changes in CSR ratings is 
concave, changes in institutional ownership is negatively related to changes in institutional 
ownership, and the indirect effect of changes in CSR on changes in stock return volatility 
through changes in institutional ownership is convex.13  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
We also find that an increase in ownership by banks (BNK), investment bank and 
independent investment advisers (INVIIA), and pension funds, foundations, and miscellaneous 
institutions (MISC) decreases stock return volatility. The direct effect of changes in CSR ratings 
on changes in stock return volatility is statistically insignificant across all models.    
 
The interactions between CSR and institutional ownership on stock return volatility 
 In this section, we examine the relation between CSR, institutional ownership, stock 
return volatility by including the interaction of CSR and institutional ownership in OLS 
regressions. The interaction terms allow us to evaluate the effect of CSR on the relation between 
institutional ownership and stock return volatility and the effect of institutional ownership on the 
                                                 
13 We find that unlike in the level specification, the direct effect of changes in CSR on changes in stock return 
volatility is not statistically significant.  It appears that the positive relation between the two-year lag of CSR level 




relation between CSR and stock return volatility. However, including interaction terms in 
regressions cannot help us to understand potential direct and indirect effects of CSR on stock 
return volatility. Thus interaction terms and path analysis provide different insights on the 
relation between CSR and stock return volatility. The results tabulated in Table 10 suggest that 
the coefficients on the interaction terms between CSR and institutional ownerships are generally 
insignificant in both the level specification (Panel A) and the change specification (Panel B).       
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Robustness tests 
 We conduct additional analyses to check the robustness of our results.  In the wake of 
corporate scandals and financial crisis, corporate governance has become important issues that 
are well aligned with public perception of corporate social responsibility. Thus, in our first 
robustness test, we include the MSCI ESG (KLD) corporate governance criterion in our CSR 
index measure.  Untabulated results from including KLD corporate governance criterion as a part 
of CSR measure are consistent with our main results.    
 Chatterji et al. (2009) indicate that the construct of CSR strengths and concerns ratings in 
the KLD database represent different measures of firms’ social performance and transparency of 
management practices. We re-estimate our models by separating the CSR strengths and concerns 
indices and examine the impact of CSR strengths and concerns indices on institutional ownership 
and stock return volatility. Untabulated results suggest that our results are largely driven by CSR 
strengths.    
 Last but not least, we examine the impact of raw CSR counts (scores) instead of CSR 
index. Untabulated results from using raw CSR scores are generally weaker than the CSR index, 
potentially reflecting the problem that raw CSR scores are not comparable across industries and 
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years. Although raw CSR scores are not significantly associated with total institutional 
ownership, the results based on institution types are largely consistent with those tabulated in the 
paper. For example, the relation between CSR and bank ownership is concave. The results based on 
change specifications are also similar to those tabulated in the paper. 
  
Conclusions 
Recent public statements by institutional investors indicate that their investment 
preferences are now tilted toward investment in CSR firms’ equities. However, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that they may not practice what they publicly promote.  In this study, we examine the 
non-linear relation between institutional ownership and CSR activities. In addition, we 
investigate the impact of firms’ CSR activities on institutional ownership across different types 
of institutions. We further examine whether the relation between CSR and institutional 
ownership has any implication on stock return volatility.  
Given that the CSR investment is subject to a diminishing marginal return and the 
increasing cost of CSR, we predict the relation between institutional ownership and CSR to be 
concave. We find empirical evidence consistent with this prediction. This evidence casts doubt 
on the notion that institutional investors invest in CSR firms because they consider social values 
as a priority of their investment decision. We find that both banks, institutions with the most 
restrictive fiduciary responsibilities, and investment banks and independent investment advisers, 
institutions with the least restrictive fiduciary duties, behave as if the net benefit of CSR 
decreases as CSR increases. This implies that the relation between CSR and institutional 
ownership does not vary across different levels of fiduciary responsibility. 
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We also examine the impact of CSR on firm risk, measured by stock return volatility, 
indirectly through its effect on institutional ownership. Given the concave relation between CSR 
and institutional ownership and negative relation between institutional ownership and firm risk 
(Bushee and Noe 2000), we expect that the relation between CSR and firm risk through 
institutional ownership to be convex. Using the path analysis, we show that increases in CSR 
reduce stock return volatility at a decreasing rate through its effect on institutional ownership. 
Our results indicate that CSR reduces firm risk indirectly through institutional ownership up to a 
point at which institutional investors view CSR as optimal.  
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Appendix A. Definitions of Institutional Ownership, CSR Measures, and Stock Return Volatility 
 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
PCTINSTI Yearend shareholdings of all institutional investors relative to total shares 
outstanding 
BNK Yearend shareholdings of banks and trusts relative to total shares outstanding  
INS Yearend shareholdings of insurance companies relative to total shares outstanding  
INVIIA Yearend shareholdings of investment banks and independent investment advisers 
relative to total shares outstanding  
MISC Yearend shareholdings of pension funds, foundations, endowments, and 




CSR index for year t-1, measured as total strengths minus total concerns, based on 
five social rating categories in KLD data: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, and product, standardized in each industry for each year to range from 
0 to 1, where year t is the year that institutional ownership is measured  
CSRIDX_C(t-1) Centered CSR index for year t-1, where year t is the year that institutional ownership 
is measured 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1)  Centered CSR index squared for year t-1, where year t is the year that institutional 
ownership is measured 
DEVRET(t+1) Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of daily stock returns for year t+1, where 
year t is the year that institutional ownership is measured 
TOBINQ Market value of equity plus book values of long-term and short-term debts divided 






Appendix B. Definitions of Control Variables for institutional ownership and return volatility 
 
Variable Name Variable Definition Reference 
MRET Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns measured over a year's time; 
[P(t) – P(t-1) + DIV(t))/P(t-1)]  minus [S&P500(t) – S&P500(t-1) + 
S&P500DIV)/S&P500(t-1)], where P is price of firm’s stock, DIV is 
total cash dividends, and S&P500 is the S&P500 Index 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
TVOL Average monthly trading volume relative to total shares outstanding 
measured over a year’s time 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
BETA Market-model beta estimated from the slope of market model: Ri = a + 
BETA*RM + εI, where Ri is firm’s daily stock returns, RM is the S&P500 
daily returns, both measured over a year, and εi is the residual error 
from market model 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
IRISK Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of market-model residuals (εi) 
calculated from daily stock returns over a year  
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
MKTVAL Natural logarithm of market value of common equity; natural logarithm 
of (PRCC_C x CSHO) where PRCC_C is the stock price at yearend 
and CSHO is common shares outstanding (in million shares) at 
yearend. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
DEBTR Ratio of debt to total assets; IB/(PRCC_C x CSHO), where IB is the 
income before extraordinary item, PRCC_C is the stock price at yearend, 
and CSHO is common shares outstanding (in million shares) at yearend 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
EP Ratio of income before extraordinary item to market value of 
common equity 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
BP Ratio of book value of common equity to market value of common 
equity; CEQ/(PRCC_C x CSHO), where CEQ is the book value of 
common equity, PRCC_C is the stock price at yearend, and CSHO is 
common shares outstanding (in million shares) at yearend 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
DP Ratio of dividends to market value of equity; DVT/(PRCC_C x 
CSHO), where DVT is the total cash dividends, PRCC_C is the stock 
price at yearend, and CSHO is common shares outstanding (in million 
shares) at yearend 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
SALEGRW Percentage change in annual sales from the previous year; [REVT(t) – 
REVT(t-1)]/REVT(t), where REVT is the annual total revenue (in 
million dollars) 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
SP500 Indicator variable that equals one if a firm is listed in the S&P500 
index and zero otherwise 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
SPRATING S&P stock rating (A+ = 9, A = 8, B+ =7, etc.) Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
SHROUT Natural logarithm of common shares outstanding (CSHO), where 
CSHO is common shares outstanding (in million shares) at yearend 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
   
FIRMAGE Number of years the firm has been listed in the CRSP database Bushee (2001) 
   
CEPS Changes in annual earnings per share deflated by prior stock price; 
[EPSPI(t) – EPSPI(t-1)]/PRCC_C(t-1), where EPSPI is the earnings 
per share and PRCC_C is the stock price at yearend 
Bushee (2001) 
   
RNDR Ratio of research and development expense to sales; XRD/REVT, 
where XRD is R&D expense and REVT is the total revenue 
Bushee (2001) 





Appendix C. Definitions of Control Variables for CSR 
 
Variable Name Variable Definition Reference 
ROA Income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by total assets (AT)  Waddock and Graves 
(1997) 
   
DEVRET Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of daily stock returns for 
year 
Campbell (2007) 
   
MKTBK Market value of common equity (PRCC_C x CSHO) divided by the 
book value of equity (CEQ) 
El Ghoul et al. (2011) 
   
RNDR Ratio of research and development expense to sales; XRD/REVT, 
where XRD is R&D expense and REVT is the total revenue 
McWilliams and Siegel 
(2001) 
   
LOGASSET Natural log of total asset (ln(AT)). Waddock and Graves 
(1997) 
   
SEGMENTS The number of business segments for each firm (BUSSEG) 
 
McWilliams and Siegel 
(2001) 
   
LOGANALYST Natural logarithm of number of analyst followings (ln(NUMEST)) 
Data source:  I/B/E/S  
Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2010) 
   
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated from the sum of squared of 
market share bases on net sales for each firm relative to the total 
industry net sales within the same industry based on the Fama-French 
48 industries  
Campbell (2007)  
   
DEBTR Ratio of debt to total assets; IB/(PRCC_C x CSHO), where IB is the 
income before extraordinary item, PRCC_C is the stock price at yearend, 
and CSHO is common shares outstanding (in million shares) at yearend 
Prior et al. (2008) 
   
CASHFLOW Cash flows from operating activities (OANCF) divided by total assets 
(AT)  
Prior et al. (2008) 
   
MEDIANCSR The industry median of CSRIDX based on the Fama-French 48 
industry   
El Ghoul et al. (2011) 








Benefit, Cost, and Net Benefit of CSR 
 













                                                 
14 Following the finance literature, we define firm value as the present value of expected future cash flows. Thus one 
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a: direct effect of centered CSR index (CSRIDX_C(t-1)) on stock return volatility 
(DEVRET(t+1)) 
b: direct effect of centered CSR index squared (CSRIDX_C2(t-1)) on stock return volatility 
(DEVRET(t+1)) 
c × e: indirect effect of CSRIDX_C(t-1) on stock return volatility through institutional ownership 
(PCTINSTI) 














 Table 1. Sample Distribution 
 
Industry Fama-French Industry Number Observations Percent (%) PCTINSTI CSRIDX(t-1) 
Banks 34 1023 7.85 0.75 0.30 
Retail 44 994 7.63 0.58 0.32 
Bus. Svc 31 821 6.3 0.59 0.51 
Chips 42 795 6.1 0.72 0.42 
Util 36 752 5.77 0.75 0.32 
Drugs 47 642 4.93 0.69 0.40 
Insurance 13 605 4.64 0.69 0.38 
Machine 30 582 4.47 0.76 0.55 
Trading Fin 21 571 4.38 0.73 0.39 
Energy 45 566 4.34 0.72 0.43 
Chemicals 14 415 3.18 0.72 0.53 
Computer 35 397 3.05 0.72 0.28 
Food 41 348 2.67 0.78 0.44 
Med. Eq. 12 320 2.46 0.76 0.37 
Transport 40 309 2.37 0.75 0.40 
Telecom 37 283 2.17 0.79 0.29 
Wholesale 32 279 2.14 0.63 0.51 
Paper 17 272 2.09 0.73 0.40 
Household 38 266 2.04 0.74 0.43 
Build. Mat. 2 261 2 0.58 0.43 
Lab. Eq. 9 251 1.93 0.64 0.42 
Books 23 204 1.57 0.69 0.44 
Clothes 43 203 1.56 0.72 0.42 
Autos 10 183 1.4 0.69 0.44 
Elec. Eq. 19 177 1.36 0.72 0.49 
Meals 22 176 1.35 0.71 0.53 
Steel 18 159 1.22 0.78 0.49 
Construct 8 142 1.09 0.71 0.53 
Aero 24 139 1.07 0.73 0.42 
Person Svc. 7 134 1.03 0.62 0.55 
Health 33 117 0.9 0.75 0.49 
Toys 11 104 0.8 0.83 0.39 
Fun/Enter 39 75 0.58 0.74 0.46 
Boxes 6 71 0.54 0.79 0.56 
Beer 15 57 0.44 0.79 0.60 
Rubber 48 47 0.36 0.67 0.42 
Gold 28 46 0.35 0.70 0.48 
Others 4 42 0.32 0.72 0.47 
Mines 26 28 0.21 0.76 0.57 
Ships 29 28 0.21 0.85 0.65 
Textiles 3 23 0.18 0.53 0.56 
Smoke 25 23 0.18 0.75 0.52 
Soda 16 22 0.17 0.74 0.61 
Agricult 27 21 0.16 0.64 0.37 
Guns 1 20 0.15 0.75 0.35 
Coal 5 19 0.15 0.65 0.66 
Real Est. 46 16 0.12 0.82 0.51 
Fabric. Prod 20 5 0.04 0.68 0.50 






Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 




Pctile Std. Dev. Min Max 
CSRIDX(t-1) 13033 0.4126 0.3750 0.2105 0.5714 0.2595 0 1 
PCTINSTI 13033 0.7049 0.7328 0.5962 0.8443 0.1784 0.1953 0.9899 
BNK 13033 0.1255 0.1218 0.0849 0.1609 0.0553 0.0214 0.6382 
INS 13033 0.0380 0.0306 0.0190 0.0482 0.0282 0.0038 0.6379 
INVIIA 13033 0.4822 0.4908 0.3704 0.5982 0.1567 0.0722 0.9080 
MISC 13033 0.0535 0.0483 0.0331 0.0662 0.0309 0.0068 0.6715 
DEVRET(t+1) 13033 -3.7925 -3.8083 -4.1185 -3.4814 0.4568 -7.7598 -0.8596 
MRET 13033 0.0073 -0.0531 -0.2827 0.2134 0.4495 -0.7962 1.7631 
TVOL 13033 0.2632 0.1841 0.0949 0.3613 0.9751 0.0205 0.9355 
BETA 13033 1.1447 1.0939 0.8100 1.4279 0.4649 0.1439 2.8168 
IRISK 13033 0.0202 0.0179 0.0129 0.0248 0.0101 0.0069 0.0692 
MKTVAL 13033 7.9135 7.8569 6.7053 9.0138 1.5798 4.6331 12.9782 
DEBTR 13033 0.2048 0.1789 0.0503 0.3070 0.1794 0 0.8123 
EP 13033 0.0308 0.0512 0.0280 0.0705 0.1080 -0.3824 0.4947 
BP 13033 0.5140 0.4498 0.2721 0.6827 0.3498 -0.1692 2.2588 
DP 13033 0.0171 0.0119 0 0.0261 0.0204 0 0.1267 
SALEGRW 13033 0.0868 0.0705 -0.0086 0.1568 0.1996 -0.4499 0.9698 
SP500 13033 0.4889 0 0 1 0.4999 0 1 
SPRATING 13033 5.2233 5 4 6 1.8145 1 9 
SHROUT 13033 4.6320 4.4960 3.7280 5.4266 1.2441 2.0874 8.3726 
FIRMAGE 13033 28.0146 23.0219 13.1726 37.8192 19.5996 3.4723 83.8615 
CEPS 13033 0.0092 0.0047 -0.0143 0.0203 0.1130 -0.4019 0.8593 





Panel B: Mean Institutional Ownership by CSRIDX(t-1) Quintiles 
 
 
PCTINSTI BNK INS INVIIA MISC TOBINQ DEVRET(t+1) 
Lowest quintile 0.7053 0.1140 0.0358 0.5017 0.0529 1.3539 -3.7181 
2nd quintile 0.7161 0.1159 0.0345 0.5059 0.0532 1.6022 -3.7561 
3rd quintile 0.7148 0.1282 0.0390 0.4936 0.0544 1.7551 -3.7776 
4th quintile 0.6951 0.1401 0.0409 0.4640 0.0560 1.4825 -3.7637 
Highest quintile 0.6886 0.1326 0.0435 0.4456 0.0504 1.4736 -3.7616 
 




Table 3. Pearson Correlations 
 
No Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 MRET 1 
2 TVOL 0.0489* 1 
3 BETA 0.1275* 0.2753* 1 
4 IRISK 0.1650* 0.2939* 0.4231* 1 
5 MKTVAL 0.0280* -0.0103 -0.2439* -0.4281* 1 
6 DEBTR 0.0158 0.0517* -0.0427* 0.0336* 0.016 1 
7 EP -0.0686* -0.0794* -0.1193* -0.3158* 0.1639* -0.0977* 1 
8 BP -0.1359* -0.0293* 0.1450* 0.2081* -0.2780* -0.1208* 0.1473* 1 
9 DP -0.0905* -0.1657* -0.0845* -0.0339* 0.0034 0.2088* 0.0378* 0.2126* 1 
10 SALEGRW -0.0004 -0.0467* 0.0103 0.0179 -0.0002 -0.011 -0.0018 -0.0192 -0.0117 1 
11 SP500 -0.0234* 0.0185 -0.2478* -0.2326* 0.7026* 0.0290* 0.0611* -0.1626* 0.022 -0.0151 1 
12 SPRATING -0.0078 -0.2883* -0.2888* -0.3724* 0.4232* -0.0686* 0.1331* -0.1765* 0.0447* 0.0260* 0.3311* 1 
13 SHROUT -0.022 0.0949* -0.0961* -0.1773* 0.8582* 0.0828* 0.0169 -0.1525* 0.0410* -0.0002 0.6441* 0.2433* 1 
14 FIRMAGE -0.0261* -0.3142* -0.2385* -0.2672* 0.3718* 0.0574* 0.0641* -0.0522* 0.1168* -0.0178 0.4203* 0.3230* 0.3009* 1 
15 CEPS 0.3422* 0.0332* 0.0995* 0.1638* -0.0314* 0.0506* 0.1815* -0.0581* -0.0224 0.0038 -0.0191 -0.0360* 0.0019 -0.0269* 1 
16 RNDR -0.0047 0.014 -0.0019 0.0444* -0.0145 -0.0240* -0.0314* -0.0097 -0.0068 0.0015 -0.0124 -0.0163 0.0014 -0.0143 0.0026 
 
See Appendix B for variable definitions.  * indicates two-tailed significance at 1% level. 
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Table 4. Impact of CSR on Institutional Ownership 
 
 PCTINSTI PCTINSTI 






MRET -0.0107 -0.0104 
(2.51)** (2.44)** 
TVOL 0.0476 0.0469 
(10.47)*** (10.34)*** 
BETA 0.0044 0.0040 
(0.69) (0.62) 
IRISK -2.5866 -2.5838 
(6.55)*** (6.56)*** 
MKRTVAL 0.0345 0.0342 
(6.46)*** (6.43)*** 
DEBTR 0.1501 0.1502 
(7.93)*** (7.94)*** 
EP 0.0056 0.0063 
(0.25) (0.29) 
BP 0.0616 0.0617 
(6.65)*** (6.69)*** 
DP -1.1698 -1.1790 
(7.93)*** (8.01)*** 
SALEGRW -0.0124 -0.0127 
(1.48) (1.52) 
SP500 0.0448 0.0441 
(4.74)*** (4.71)*** 
SPRATING -0.0004 -0.0004 
(0.21) (0.18) 
SHROUT -0.0510 -0.0500 
(8.60)*** (8.47)*** 
FIRMAGE 0.0003 0.0003 
(1.61) (1.67)* 
CEPS -0.0361 -0.0359 
(2.47)** (2.46)** 
RNDR -0.0700 -0.0684 
(2.85)*** (2.79)*** 
Constant 0.3538 0.3567 
(7.90)*** (7.81)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 
R-squared 0.3109 0.3129 
 
See Appendices A and B for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 46
Table 5. Impact of CSR on Holdings by Various Institution Types 
 
BNK BNK INS INS INVIIA INVIIA MISC MISC 
CSRIDX(t-1) 0.0051  -0.0016  -0.0151  -0.0028  
(1.66)*  (0.95)  (1.68)*  (1.66)*  
CSRIDX_C(t-1) 0.0113  0.0006  0.0041  -0.0002 
(2.85)***  (0.31)  (0.38)  (0.09) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1) -0.0228  -0.0082  -0.0705  -0.0096 
(2.74)***  (1.78)*  (3.00)***  (2.11)** 
MRET -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0014 0.0015 0.0099 0.0101 -0.0029 -0.0028 
(0.46) (0.40) (2.17)** (2.21)** (2.95)*** (3.00)*** (3.70)*** (3.67)*** 
TVOL 0.0041 0.0039 0.0028 0.0028 0.0388 0.0384 0.0047 0.0046 
(3.83)*** (3.69)*** (4.93)*** (4.85)*** (11.15)*** (11.03)*** (7.40)*** (7.33)*** 
BETA 0.0078 0.0077 0.0024 0.0024 -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0023 -0.0023 
(4.69)*** (4.62)*** (2.54)** (2.51)** (0.27) (0.33) (2.08)** (2.11)** 
IRISK -0.7825 -0.7819 -0.2893 -0.2891 -1.4147 -1.4129 -0.2558 -0.2556 
(8.21)*** (8.18)*** (5.39)*** (5.39)*** (4.46)*** (4.47)*** (3.86)*** (3.86)*** 
MKRTVAL 0.0082 0.0081 0.0049 0.0048 0.0159 0.0157 0.0059 0.0058 
(6.18)*** (6.14)*** (7.08)*** (7.05)*** (3.76)*** (3.73)*** (6.56)*** (6.54)*** 
DEBTR 0.0070 0.0070 0.0066 0.0066 0.1179 0.1180 0.0190 0.0190 
(1.61) (1.62) (2.54)** (2.55)** (7.65)*** (7.66)*** (6.08)*** (6.09)*** 
EP 0.0044 0.0046 0.0012 0.0013 0.0391 0.0396 -0.0018 -0.0017 
(0.76) (0.78) (0.36) (0.38) (2.08)** (2.11)** (0.41) (0.40) 
BP 0.0091 0.0091 0.0070 0.0070 0.0372 0.0372 0.0034 0.0034 
(3.91)*** (3.92)*** (5.32)*** (5.32)*** (4.93)*** (4.96)*** (2.04)** (2.05)** 
DP 0.1642 0.1623 -0.0503 -0.0510 -1.2046 -1.2105 -0.0953 -0.0961 
(4.02)*** (3.98)*** (2.50)** (2.53)** (10.15)*** (10.21)*** (3.38)*** (3.41)*** 
SALEGRW -0.0050 -0.0051 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0054 -0.0054 
(2.50)** (2.53)** (0.66) (0.64) (0.34) (0.37) (3.25)*** (3.27)*** 
SP500 0.0137 0.0135 0.0043 0.0043 0.0168 0.0164 0.0044 0.0043 
(5.61)*** (5.57)*** (2.76)*** (2.73)*** (2.22)** (2.18)** (2.59)*** (2.56)** 
SPRATING 0.0016 0.0016 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0035 -0.0035 0.0006 0.0006 
(2.95)*** (2.98)*** (0.75) (0.77) (2.15)** (2.12)** (2.00)** (2.03)** 
SHROUT -0.0053 -0.0051 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0389 -0.0383 -0.0047 -0.0046 
(3.67)*** (3.54)*** (4.13)*** (4.04)*** (8.28)*** (8.18)*** (5.17)*** (5.08)*** 
FIRMAGE 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(5.09)*** (5.14)*** (0.16) (0.17) (0.37) (0.34) (1.73)* (1.75)* 
CEPS 0.0017 0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0400 -0.0398 0.0015 0.0015 
(0.48) (0.50) (0.12) (0.11) (3.33)*** (3.33)*** (0.54) (0.55) 
RNDR -0.0164 -0.0160 -0.0091 -0.0090 -0.0417 -0.0407 -0.0067 -0.0066 
(3.55)*** (3.47)*** (2.31)** (2.30)** (1.88)* (1.83)* (1.64) (1.61) 
Constant 0.0556 0.0587 0.0185 0.0184 0.2456 0.2442 0.0025 0.0020 
(3.96)*** (4.10)*** (2.75)*** (2.74)*** (7.96)*** (7.81)*** (0.41) (0.34) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 
R-squared 0.4486 0.4495 0.2245 0.2250 0.4154 0.4165 0.1716 0.1722 
 
See Appendices A and B for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Direct and Indirect Impact of CSR on Stock Return Volatility 
 
Panel A: Regression of Stock Return Volatility on Institutional Ownership and CSR 
 
DEVRET(t+1) DEVRET(t+1) 










CSRIDX_C(t-1) 0.0185 0.0192 
(1.52) (1.57) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1) 0.0013 -0.0018 
(0.05) (0.06) 
MRET 0.0319 0.0316 
(4.70)*** (4.66)*** 
TVOL 0.0675 0.0678 
(22.87)*** (22.86)*** 
MKTVAL -0.1446 -0.1414 
(37.05)*** (35.82)*** 
DEBTR 0.0222 0.0244 
(1.56) (1.71)* 
EP -0.5126 -0.5087 
(20.72)*** (20.57)*** 
BP 0.0250 0.0246 
(3.12)*** (3.08)*** 
DP -1.6810 -1.6228 
(12.69)*** (12.16)*** 
SALEGRW 0.1151 0.1117 
(9.73)*** (9.45)*** 
SP500 0.0287 0.0308 
(4.08)*** (4.37)*** 
SPRATING -0.0282 -0.0276 
(18.59)*** (18.11)*** 
SHROUT 0.0902 0.0893 
(20.87)*** (20.61)*** 
FIRMAGE -0.0006 -0.0005 
(4.11)*** (3.59)*** 
CEPS 0.1176 0.1194 
(5.36)*** (5.46)*** 
RNDR 0.0927 0.0898 
(4.63)*** (4.49)*** 
Constant -3.5069 -3.5207 
(117.41)*** (117.95)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 




Panel B: Summary of Direct and Indirect Impact of CSR on Stock Return Volatility – 
based on One-Year Lagged CSR  
 
 PCTINSTI    
 Direct Indirect    
CSRIDX_C (t-1) 0.01051 -0.00122    
CSRIDX_C2 (t-1) 0.00030 0.00259***    
      
  BNK INS INVIIA MISC 
 Direct Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect 
CSRIDX_C (t-1) 0.01091 -0.00164*** -0.00001 -0.00011 0.00006 
CSRIDX_C2 (t-1) -0.00042 0.00134*** 0.00004 0.00074** 0.00121** 
 
See Appendices A and B for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 




Table 7. Results Based on Two-Year Lagged CSR 
 
Panel A: Impact of CSR on Institutional Ownership 
 
 PCTINSTI PCTINSTI 
CSRIDX(t-2) -0.0082 
(0.74) 
CSRIDX_C(t-2)  0.0096 
 (0.79) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-2)  -0.0912 
 (3.13)*** 
Constant 0.3541 0.3568 
(7.91)*** (7.83)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 
R-squared 0.3108 0.3123 
 
 
Panel B: Impact of CSR on Holdings by Various Institution Types 
 
BNK BNK INS INS INVIIA INVIIA MISC MISC 
CSRIDX(t-2) 0.0031 -0.0003 -0.0129  -0.0026  
(1.03) (0.18) (1.44)  (1.57)  
CSRIDX_C(t-2) 0.0070 0.0012  -0.0016  -0.0005 
(1.98)** (0.66)  (0.17)  (0.26) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-2) -0.0201 -0.0077  -0.0575  -0.0108 
(2.44)** (1.62)  (2.46)**  (2.44)** 
Constant 0.0556 0.0581 0.0185 0.0188 0.2460 0.2447 0.0026 0.0023 
(3.97)*** (4.07)*** (2.72)*** (2.79)*** (7.97)*** (7.84)*** (0.43) (0.37) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 



















CSRIDX_C(t-2) 0.0242 0.0213 
(2.24)** (2.05)** 
CSRIDX_C2(t-2) 0.0101 -0.0341 
(0.35) (1.22) 
Constant -3.5058 -3.4208 
(117.34)*** (119.13)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 
R-squared 0.7319 0.7407 
 
 
Panel D: Summary of Direct and Indirect Impact of CSR on Stock Return Volatility – 
Based on Two-Year Lagged CSR 
 
 PCTINSTI    
 Direct Indirect    
CSRIDX_C (t-2) 0.0137** -0.0006    
CSRIDX_C2 (t-2) 0.0023 0.0021***    
      
  BNK INS INVIIA MISC 
 Direct Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect 
CSRIDX_C (t-2) 0.0121** -0.0011** -0.0001 0.00001 0.0001 
CSRIDX_C2 (t-2) -0.0079 0.0013** 0.0002 0.0002** 0.0010** 
 
In this table, CSR variables are measured for year t-2, where year t is the year that institutional ownership is 
measured. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Test of Reverse Causality 
 





PCTINSTI(t-2)  -0.0467 
(1.18) 
ROA -0.0147 -0.0161 
(0.36) (0.39) 
DEVRET -0.3927 -0.3819 
(0.84) (0.82) 
MKTBK 0.0129 0.0131 
(2.93)*** (2.94)*** 
RNDR 0.0104 0.0108 
(0.25) (0.26) 
LOGASSET 0.0326 0.0328 
(2.98)*** (3.00)*** 
SEGMENTS -0.0007 -0.0007 
(0.82) (0.82) 
LOGANALYST 0.0133 0.0129 
(1.98)** (1.91)* 
HHI -0.5511 -0.5476 
(1.21) (1.21) 
DEBTR -0.0749 -0.0750 
(3.07)*** (3.09)*** 
CASHFLOW 0.2341 0.2345 
(4.21)*** (4.18)*** 
MEDIANCSR 0.0067 0.0068 
(0.88) (0.89) 
Constant 0.2421 0.2374 
(2.59)*** (2.55)** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 






Panel A (Continue) 
 

















ROA -0.0143 -0.0138 -0.0145 -0.0152 -0.0143 -0.0140 -0.0164 -0.0162 
(0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.38) (0.35) (0.34) (0.40) (0.40) 
DEVRET -0.2931 -0.3157 -0.3696 -0.3503 -0.3525 -0.3364 -0.3707 -0.3744 
(0.68) (0.71) (0.81) (0.77) (0.78) (0.73) (0.83) (0.82) 
MKTBK 0.0140 0.0139 0.0137 0.0137 0.0127 0.0130 0.0138 0.0138 
(3.18)*** (3.13)*** (3.06)*** (3.06)*** (2.90)*** (2.94)*** (3.08)*** (3.09)*** 
RNDR 0.0144 0.0141 0.0114 0.0126 0.0109 0.0117 0.0127 0.0125 
(0.34) (0.34) (0.27) (0.30) (0.26) (0.28) (0.30) (0.30) 
LOGASSET 0.0318 0.0322 0.0332 0.0329 0.0313 0.0317 0.0328 0.0329 
(2.93)*** (2.92)*** (3.03)*** (2.98)*** (2.85)*** (2.89)*** (3.00)*** (3.00)*** 
SEGMENTS -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 
(0.79) (0.78) (0.76) (0.76) (0.87) (0.85) (0.75) (0.75) 
LOGANALYST 0.0108 0.0110 0.0117 0.0113 0.0138 0.0131 0.0114 0.0114 
(1.63) (1.64) (1.76)* (1.70)* (2.05)** (1.93)* (1.72)* (1.73)* 
HHI -0.5788 -0.5762 -0.5671 -0.5728 -0.5547 -0.5525 -0.5762 -0.5728 
(1.28) (1.27) (1.25) (1.26) (1.22) (1.22) (1.27) (1.27) 
DEBTR -0.0804 -0.0807 -0.0813 -0.0811 -0.0730 -0.0746 -0.0796 -0.0792 
(3.29)*** (3.30)*** (3.33)*** (3.32)*** (2.99)*** (3.06)*** (3.23)*** (3.21)*** 
CASHFLOW 0.2246 0.2264 0.2286 0.2288 0.2326 0.2321 0.2302 0.2304 
(4.02)*** (4.05)*** (4.07)*** (4.07)*** (4.19)*** (4.15)*** (4.13)*** (4.13)*** 
MEDIANCSR 0.0066 0.0066 0.0065 0.0065 0.0069 0.0069 0.0065 0.0064 
(0.86) (0.87) (0.86) (0.86) (0.90) (0.92) (0.86) (0.84) 
Constant 0.2181 0.2203 0.2274 0.2245 0.2415 0.2356 0.2253 0.2276 
(2.30)** (2.34)** (2.43)** (2.39)** (2.56)** (2.50)** (2.37)** (2.40)** 
Industry 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 









DEVRET(t-1)  0.0170 
(1.51) 
CSRIDX_C 0.0262 0.0238 
(1.92)* (1.73)* 
CSRIDX_C2 -0.1130 -0.1096 
(4.06)*** (3.87)*** 
MRET 0.0164 0.0154 
(3.68)*** (3.49)*** 
TVOL 0.0421 0.0427 
(7.43)*** (7.41)*** 
BETA -0.0289 0.0029 
(2.17)** (0.26) 
IRISK -5.8767 -2.7593 
(6.26)*** (7.24)*** 
MKRTVAL 0.0310 0.0299 
(5.46)*** (5.19)*** 
DEBTR 0.1510 0.1483 
(6.88)*** (6.66)*** 
EP 0.0524 0.0761 
(1.83)* (2.84)*** 
BP 0.0540 0.0522 
(5.20)*** (5.18)*** 
DP -1.0331 -1.0654 
(4.89)*** (4.83)*** 
SALEGRW -0.0256 -0.0247 
(2.74)*** (2.77)*** 
SP500 0.0456 0.0463 
(4.79)*** (4.83)*** 
SPRATING -0.0010 -0.0017 
(0.51) (0.83) 
SHROUT -0.0444 -0.0447 
(6.63)*** (6.67)*** 
FIRMAGE 0.0002 0.0002 
(1.29) (1.14) 
CEPS -0.0122 -0.0260 
(0.43) (1.01) 
RNDR -0.0623 -0.0646 
(2.80)*** (2.95)*** 
Constant 0.9655 0.4447 
(7.15)*** (6.87)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 





Panel B (Continue) 
 
BNK(t+1) BNK(t+1) INS(t+1) INS(t+1) INVIIA(t+1) INVIIA(t+1) MISC(t+1) MISC(t+1) 
DEVRET -0.0208 0.0065 0.1236 0.0055 
(0.85) (0.11) (0.79) (1.07) 
DEVRET(t-1)  -0.0081 -0.0013 0.0186 -0.0018 
(1.18) (0.85) (0.79) (0.76) 
CSRIDX_C 0.0142 0.0146 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0086 0.0063 0.0005 0.0004 
(3.30)*** (3.37)*** (0.02) (0.08) (0.74) (0.55) (0.23) (0.18) 
CSRIDX_C2 -0.0226 -0.0231 -0.0058 -0.0056 -0.0759 -0.0726 -0.0094 -0.0092 
(2.86)*** (2.92)*** (1.37) (1.33) (3.44)*** (3.22)*** (2.01)** (1.97)** 
MRET 0.0027 0.0033 0.0025 0.0026 0.0114 0.0102 -0.0022 -0.0020 
(2.46)** (3.04)*** (2.99)*** (3.01)*** (2.09)** (1.89)* (2.83)*** (3.02)*** 
TVOL 0.0049 0.0050 0.0025 0.0026 0.0376 0.0382 0.0044 0.0045 
(3.94)*** (3.98)*** (3.87)*** (3.91)*** (9.07)*** (9.28)*** (6.67)*** (6.74)*** 
BETA 0.0119 0.0080 -0.0007 0.0015 -0.0330 -0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0007 
(4.35)*** (3.31)*** (0.48) (1.65)* (3.45)*** (0.28) (1.61) (0.47) 
IRISK -0.2382 -0.6946 -0.4230 -0.2385 -4.4563 -1.4169 -0.3807 -0.2160 
(1.03) (4.95)*** (4.12)*** (4.59)*** (5.98)*** (3.24)*** (3.39)*** (2.48)** 
MKRTVAL 0.0069 0.0065 0.0040 0.0037 0.0134 0.0125 0.0065 0.0062 
(5.41)*** (5.18)*** (5.44)*** (5.13)*** (2.88)*** (2.68)*** (6.81)*** (6.62)*** 
DEBTR 0.0057 0.0060 0.0081 0.0079 0.1222 0.1196 0.0191 0.0189 
(1.44) (1.51) (3.16)*** (3.08)*** (6.45)*** (6.15)*** (5.44)*** (5.36)*** 
EP 0.0065 0.0034 -0.0017 -0.0002 0.0467 0.0696 -0.0052 -0.0037 
(0.94) (0.54) (0.56) (0.06) (2.16)** (3.53)*** (1.03) (0.76) 
BP 0.0086 0.0088 0.0064 0.0062 0.0354 0.0336 0.0027 0.0025 
(3.39)*** (3.42)*** (3.35)*** (3.34)*** (4.37)*** (4.32)*** (1.65)* (1.54) 
DP 0.1371 0.1308 -0.0336 -0.0400 -1.1092 -1.1366 -0.0731 -0.0801 
(2.98)*** (2.93)*** (1.91)* (2.15)** (6.35)*** (6.48)*** (2.12)** (2.30)** 
SALEGRW -0.0025 -0.0028 0.0013 0.0013 -0.0155 -0.0145 -0.0052 -0.0052 
(1.06) (1.13) (0.77) (0.78) (2.29)** (2.11)** (2.06)** (2.05)** 
SP500 0.0150 0.0148 0.0043 0.0043 0.0174 0.0181 0.0043 0.0043 
(4.88)*** (4.86)*** (2.81)*** (2.85)*** (1.99)** (2.06)** (2.49)** (2.51)** 
SPRATING 0.0021 0.0022 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0026 -0.0032 0.0005 0.0005 
(3.72)*** (3.68)*** (1.72)* (1.53) (1.46) (1.76)* (1.61) (1.42) 
SHROUT -0.0043 -0.0038 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0353 -0.0358 -0.0051 -0.0049 
(3.25)*** (2.97)*** (2.74)*** (2.62)*** (7.77)*** (7.73)*** (4.84)*** (5.01)*** 
FIRMAGE 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(4.49)*** (4.51)*** (0.39) (0.30) (0.14) (0.31) (1.22) (1.12) 
CEPS -0.0008 0.0017 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0230 -0.0366 0.0053 0.0048 
(0.13) (0.25) (0.08) (0.16) (1.07) (2.04)** (2.43)** (2.17)** 
RNDR -0.0176 -0.0172 -0.0100 -0.0101 -0.0423 -0.0446 -0.0070 -0.0071 
(3.59)*** (3.54)*** (2.57)** (2.61)*** (2.03)** (2.19)** (1.63) (1.65)* 
Constant -0.0481 0.0169 0.0568 0.0213 0.8689 0.3652 0.0449 0.0120 
(1.32) (1.14) (3.30)*** (2.01)** (7.98)*** (6.56)*** (3.12)*** (1.15) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 
R-squared 0.4495 0.4491 0.2561 0.2557 0.4007 0.3955 0.1589 0.1587 
 
In this table, institutional ownership variables are measured for year t-1 and year t-2 in Panel A and for year t+1 in 
Panel B. CSR variables are measured for year t. DEVRET is stock return volatility for year t and DEVRET(t-1) is 
stock return volatility for year t-1. See Appendices A, B, and C for other variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate 





Table 9 Change Specification 
 
Panel A: Regression of Changes in Institutional Ownership on Changes in CSR 
 
∆PCTINSTI ∆BNK ∆INS ∆INVIIA ∆MISC 
∆CSRIDX_C (t-1) 0.0034 0.0058 0.0004 -0.0022 0.00003 
(0.67) (2.96)*** (0.32) (0.46) (0.03) 
∆CSRIDX_C2 (t-1) -0.0112 -0.0040 -0.0021 -0.0175 0.0040 
(2.14)** (2.00)** (0.70) (1.87)* (1.59) 
∆MRET -0.0327 -0.0073 -0.0044 -0.0193 -0.0013 
(11.92)*** (8.18)*** (6.94)*** (7.73)*** (2.12)** 
∆TVOL -0.0030 0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0044 0.0002 
(2.59)*** (3.24)*** (1.00) (4.10)*** (0.69) 
∆MKTVAL 0.0702 0.0145 0.0090 0.0437 0.0029 
(14.42)*** (9.05)*** (7.98)*** (9.71)*** (2.58)** 
∆BETA -0.0057 0.0021 0.0012 -0.0109 -0.0003 
(1.80)* (1.87)* (1.54) (3.74)*** (0.35) 
∆IRISK -0.2302 -0.0084 -0.0060 -0.0607 -0.0603 
(1.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.32) (1.28) 
∆DEBTR -0.0186 -0.0037 -0.0062 -0.0103 0.0021 
(1.09) (0.60) (1.60) (0.64) (0.50) 
∆EP -0.0040 0.0091 0.0054 -0.0199 0.0040 
(0.30) (2.03)** (1.94)* (1.59) (1.38) 
∆BP 0.0016 0.0008 -0.0019 0.0062 0.0012 
(0.24) (0.37) (1.33) (1.00) (0.73) 
∆DP -0.1286 0.0151 0.0163 -0.2796 0.0089 
(1.36) (0.50) (0.87) (3.32)*** (0.41) 
∆SALEGRW 0.0106 -0.0030 0.0004 0.0131 0.0001 
(2.39)** (2.05)** (0.42) (3.24)*** (0.12) 
∆SP500 -0.0153 -0.0007 -0.0020 -0.0124 -0.0007 
(7.97)*** (0.96) (3.76)*** (6.77)*** (1.35) 
∆SHROUT -0.0548 -0.0095 -0.0052 -0.0391 -0.0019 
(7.99)*** (3.92)*** (2.92)*** (6.27)*** (1.22) 
∆CEPS -0.0115 -0.0051 -0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0048 
(1.32) (1.80)* (1.39) (0.20) (2.48)** 
∆RNDR 0.0196 -0.0041 -0.0076 0.0443 0.0044 
(0.46) (0.34) (0.96) (1.13) (0.45) 
Constant 0.0894 -0.0006 0.0118 0.0601 0.0163 
(10.73)*** (0.12) (3.62)*** (8.93)*** (6.96)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 13033 13033 13033 







Panel B: Regression of Changes in Stock Return Volatility on Changes in Institutional 













∆CSRIDX_C (t-1) -0.0060 -0.0061 
(0.56) (0.59) 
∆CSRIDX_C2 (t-1) 0.0082 0.0086 
(0.35) (0.36) 
∆MRET 0.0085 0.0091 
(1.69)* (1.81)* 
∆TVOL -0.0005 -0.0005 
(0.20) (0.22) 
∆MKTVAL -0.0115 -0.0126 
(1.29) (1.41) 
∆DEBTR 0.0976 0.0990 
(2.91)*** (2.96)*** 
∆EP -0.2190 -0.2195 
(10.20)*** (10.22)*** 
∆BP 0.0243 0.0247 
(2.14)** (2.18)** 
∆DP 1.2323 1.2286 
(7.28)*** (7.26)*** 
∆SALEGRW -0.0115 -0.0112 
(1.39) (1.36) 
∆SP500 0.0002 0.0002 
(0.05) (0.05) 
∆SHROUT 0.0027 0.0031 
(0.19) (0.22) 
∆CEPS 0.0584 0.0578 
(4.20)*** (4.16)*** 
∆RNDR 0.0394 0.0422 
(0.53) (0.57) 
Constant -0.0805 -0.0862 
(3.74)*** (3.99)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 







Panel C: Summary of Direct and Indirect Impact of CSR on Stock Return Volatility  
 
 ∆PCTINSTI    
 Direct Indirect    
∆CSRIDX_C -0.003305 -0.000011    
∆CSRIDX_C2 0.002013 0.000017**    
      
  ∆BNK ∆INS ∆INVIIA ∆MISC 
 Direct Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect 
∆CSRIDX_C -0.003360 -0.000258** 0.000028 0.000010 -0.0000431 
∆CSRIDX_C2 0.002111 0.000079** -0.000066 0.000037* -0.000239 
 
Changes in CSR are changes from t-3 to t-1. Changes in institutional ownership and changes in control variables are 
changes from t-1 to t. Changes in DEVRET are changes from t to t+1. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10 The Impact of CSR and Institutional Ownership on Stock Return Volatility 
through the Interaction of CSR Index and Institutional Ownership 
 
Panel A:  Levels of CSR Index, Institutional Ownership, and Stock Return Volatility 
 
DEVRET(t+1) DEVRET(t+1) DEVRET(t+1) DEVRET(t+1) 
PCTINSTI -0.0749 -0.0770 
(4.32)*** (4.41)*** 
BNK -0.2831 -0.3049 
(4.83)*** (5.19)*** 
INS -0.1961 -0.2343 
(0.51) (0.33) 
INVIIA -0.0107 -0.0068 
(1.99)** (2.39)** 
MISC -0.3732 -0.4293 
(4.12)*** (4.80)*** 
CSRIDX_C(t-1) x PCTINSTI -0.0263 
(0.42) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1) x PCTINSTI 0.0157 
(0.10) 
CSRIDX_C(t-2) x PCTINSTI  -0.0580 
(0.99) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-2) x PCTINSTI  0.0422 
(0.26) 
CSRIDX_C(t-1) x BNK 0.2357 
(1.19) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1) x BNK -0.1071 
(0.22) 
CSRIDX_C(t-1) x INS 0.1317 
(0.40) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1) x INS 1.0631 
(1.30) 
CSRIDX_C(t-1) x INVIIA -0.1042 
(1.49) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1) x INVIIA  0.0195 
(0.11) 
CSRIDX_C(t-1) x MISC 0.0027 
(0.01) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1) x MISC -0.6180 
(0.83) 
CSRIDX_C(t-2) x BNK -0.1138 
(0.65) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-2) x BNK 0.4966 
(1.04) 
CSRIDX_C(t-2) x INS -0.0573 
(0.18) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-2) x INS 1.7950 
(1.12) 
CSRIDX_C(t-2) x INVIIA -0.1105 
(1.73)* 
CSRIDX_C2(t-2) x INVIIA  -0.0978 
(0.40) 
CSRIDX_C(t-2) x MISC -0.1605 
(0.73) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-2) x MISC 0.1664 
(0.22) 
CSRIDX_C(t-1) 0.0330 0.0294 
(0.71) (0.57) 
CSRIDX_C2(t-1) -0.0320 -0.0412 
(0.27) (0.32) 
CSRIDX_C(t-2) 0.0606 0.0972 
(1.41) (2.10)** 
CSRIDX_C2(t-2) -0.0592 -0.1577 
(0.49) (1.22) 
MRET 0.0543 0.0543 0.0539 0.0538 
(7.42)*** (7.43)*** (7.36)*** (7.35)*** 
ֆ所
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TVOL 0.0663 0.0662 0.0667 0.0663 
(22.55)*** (22.50)*** (22.57)*** (22.45)*** 
MKTVAL -0.1637 -0.1639 -0.1602 -0.1606 
(41.38)*** (41.52)*** (40.02)*** (40.27)*** 
DEBTR -0.0207 -0.0205 -0.0199 -0.0206 
(1.44) (1.43) (1.39) (1.43) 
EP -0.3847 -0.3839 -0.3807 -0.3796 
(13.36)*** (13.34)*** (13.21)*** (13.18)*** 
BP 0.0210 0.0209 0.0221 0.0213 
(2.45)** (2.44)** (2.57)** (2.48)** 
DP -2.3548 -2.3536 -2.2755 -2.2761 
(15.63)*** (15.62)*** (14.95)*** (14.95)*** 
SALEGRW 0.1148 0.1151 0.1109 0.1114 
(8.59)*** (8.61)*** (8.30)*** (8.34)*** 
SP500 0.0180 0.0184 0.0222 0.0231 
(2.60)*** (2.67)*** (3.18)*** (3.32)*** 
SPRATING -0.0215 -0.0216 -0.0208 -0.0208 
(14.89)*** (14.91)*** (14.43)*** (14.45)*** 
SHROUT 0.1189 0.1190 0.1180 0.1182 
(27.03)*** (27.04)*** (26.74)*** (26.79)*** 
FIRMAGE -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 
(5.24)*** (5.24)*** (4.67)*** (4.73)*** 
CEPS 0.2061 0.2056 0.2083 0.2074 
(8.24)*** (8.22)*** (8.28)*** (8.24)*** 
RNDR 0.0135 0.0141 0.0075 0.0096 
(0.58) (0.61) (0.33) (0.41) 
Constant -3.4128 -3.4092 -3.4247 -3.4145 
(119.97)*** (119.05)*** (120.05)*** (118.98)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 13033 13033 

















∆CSRIDX_C (t-1) x ∆PCTINSTI -0.0005 
(0.01) 
∆CSRIDX_C2 (t-1) x ∆PCTINSTI 0.0299 
(0.15) 
∆CSRIDX_C (t-1) x ∆BNK 0.1317 
(0.70) 
∆CSRIDX_C2 (t-1) x ∆BNK -0.0264 
(0.06) 
∆CSRIDX_C (t-1) x ∆INS 0.4766 
(1.24) 
∆CSRIDX_C2 (t-1) x ∆INS -0.8052 
(1.23) 
∆CSRIDX_C (t-1) x ∆INVIIA -0.0374 
(0.35) 
∆CSRIDX_C2 (t-1) x ∆INVIIA 0.0451 
(0.20) 
∆CSRIDX_C (t-1) x ∆MISC -0.2122 
(0.75) 
∆CSRIDX_C2 (t-1) x ∆MISC -0.0926 
(0.15) 
∆CSRIDX_C (t-1) -0.0061 -0.0039 
(0.59) (0.36) 
∆CSRIDX_C2 (t-1) 0.0082 0.0075 
(0.39) (0.35) 
∆MRET 0.0085 0.0091 
(1.56) (1.67)* 
∆TVOL -0.0005 -0.0005 
(0.18) (0.19) 
∆MKTVAL -0.0115 -0.0128 
(1.19) (1.31) 
∆DEBTR 0.0976 0.0985 
(2.65)*** (2.67)*** 
∆EP -0.2189 -0.2191 
(8.62)*** (8.64)*** 
∆BP 0.0242 0.0245 
(1.60) (1.62) 
∆DP 1.2325 1.2303 
(5.94)*** (5.95)*** 
∆SALEGRW -0.0115 -0.0115 
(1.18) (1.18) 
∆SP500 0.0002 0.0005 
(0.05) (0.10) 
∆SHROUT 0.0028 0.0028 
(0.19) (0.19) 
∆CEPS 0.0584 0.0575 
(3.87)*** (3.82)*** 




Constant -0.0805 -0.0865 
(4.63)*** (4.93)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 13033 13033 
R-squared 0.6515 0.6520 
 
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
